

ENDORSIUM WHITEPAPER

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www.endorsium.org

Abstract. A web3 ecosystem deployed on The Open Network (TON) designed to allow individuals to tokenize their attention and use it to compete for luxury goods or services, creating a new way to access luxury independently of its price. The purpose ultimately is to elevate mankind by facilitating the diffusion of beauty in the world.

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I. INTRODUCTION

I.1 About luxury

Luxury has always been a means for mankind to elevate itself through the search and the implementation of manufactured beauty into the world. We believe that this beauty acts as a powerful though underestimated driver for mankind's accomplishments, which can be attested by millennia of global history.

This beauty acts as a driver for all human beings, respectively of their personal sensitivities and tastes. It is intuitive to think this beauty contributes to the fulfillment and happiness of the person who experiences them.

In this sense, we consider the luxury industry as being of public utility.

I.2 About the price

In a transactional system (where you must pay a certain price to obtain a certain good or service), pricing is key. The price must allow the company to cover its costs and investments, as well as fitting into the purchase power of its customer target. In other terms, it defines the size of the circle "How many people can buy this price". Higher the price, smaller is the circle. The number of potential customers for a certain good or service then is the intersection between "How many people are interested in this good or service" and "How many people can buy this price". We can call this intersection "the Demand".

In a transactional system, price is also influenced by the ratio between demand and supply. A very desirable product or service with a supply able to follow the demand won't change its price, it will just scale. Though, if the supply is not able to follow the demand, price will increase to decrease the demand to a number the supply can follow while maximizing its profits. In Luxury this phenomenon is common.

Therefore we should consider the price as a gate:

- for a business: it limits the demand and the potential revenue of the good or service
- for a person: it limits its possibility to access the desired good or service

From a business standpoint, this means that an extraordinary good or service may not find commercial success because its potential-customers base (people *able* to pay the price) is just too small (the more the price increases the less there are potential customers for it, and this curve is decreasing exponentially). Therefore, proposing a powerful alternative to this "cash-gate" could help companies to extend their potential-customers base to almost the entirety of their fan base.

Moreover, deleting the price makes the acquisition process more honest, as it fully focuses on the good or service itself and the company behind it. It deletes acquisition noises such as the price being a component of desirability.

Consequently, it seems interesting to find an alternative to this cash-gate, as it is an obstacle for both business and the diffusion of beauty.

I.3 About the attention

Every year, brands spend colossal amounts of money in Communication and Marketing campaigns in order to increase or reinforce their base of followers.

The goal is simple: being visible, attracting attention in order to remain in the mind of people to, potentially one day, sell something to them.

The classical process is the following: the prospect gives attention to the Communication contents issued by the company and transmitted by intermediaries (Physical or digital advertising mediums such as billboards, ads, social media posts, etc...). In this process, intermediaries which manage these advertising mediums earn money, money spent by the brand and which the latter hopes to get back with mark-ups by converting the attention reached into sales.

In other terms, your attention is monetized but not by you. It is this way because it is intangible.

II. ENDORSIUM

II.1 The Endorsium Association

The Endorsium protocol is legally represented by the Endorsium Association, a non-profit organization based in Geneva, Switzerland. Its purpose is to promote innovation, creativity and the transmission in the luxury sector, especially by developing and leveraging new technologies and digital applications.

In particular, Endorsium Association provides a technological and cultural framework designed to transform how luxury brands connect with their community. By combining tokenization and engagement, it offers a neutral and programmable framework to build new channels for loyalty, activation, and revenue.

To this end, the Endorsium Association works with business partners (interfaces, brands, or others) aligned with its vision. While these business partners are free to monetize or implement this protocol according to their own strategies, the Association ensures the integrity of the token distribution/recycling logic and oversees its proper use through operating licenses, a decentralized architecture, and ensures both technological and ethical safeguards.

II.2 The Open Network (TON Blockchain)

As a community-driven project, Endorsium relies on adapted digital technologies. We aim to diffuse beauty, and diffusion is about communication, which is the reason why we chose to deploy the ecosystem on The Open Network (TON), a blockchain integrated in the billion-users messaging/social media app Telegram. TON is built to be highly scalable and to offer a premium user experience, which fits with our purpose.

For further information:

<https://ton.org/>

<https://ton.foundation/en>

<https://docs.ton.org/>

II.3 EDRSM Tokenomics

EDRSM is the native token of Endorsium. It is essential for tokenizing attention (converting attention into a measurable on-chain unit) and participating in the campaigns organized by the auctioneers.

EDRSM is a TEP-74 jetton standard issued on The Open Network (TON) blockchain. The jetton master is: **EQDT90AxN-zW_ofQR6CGPh68dtnx7mfr7Cu3kYUo6MSdrjgl** ([view on the blockchain](#)).

It has been issued by the founding team. Its initial and maximal total supply is: 100,000,000,000 (one hundred billion) tokens (minted on the 2nd September 2026, with mint

authority permanently revoked). At the TGE date, the Founding Team transferred 80% of this total supply to the Endorsium Association and retained 20%.

Therefore, EDRSM tokenomics is composed as follows:

- Community: 80% (80 billion tokens)
- Founding team: 20% (20 billion tokens)

As a Jetton, EDRSM is seamlessly transferable across TON-compatible wallets and decentralized exchanges, and tradable on centralized exchanges that support TON assets. However, the secondary market of EDRSM is not organized by the Endorsium Association, meaning no liquidity support will be provided by the Endorsium Association. The latter solely focuses on its protocol, logic of distribution, utility and recycling.

III. THE PROTOCOL

The Endorsium Protocol revolves around three types of actors: the *auctioneers*, the *bidders*, the *miners*. They all interact with the Endorsium Protocol through the *interfaces*.

Principle:

The *auctioneers* organize auction-like competitions (thereafter called auctions for the sake of simplicity) in which the holders can *bid* their EDRSM in order to win the prize of the auction. The net EDRSM proceeds received from winning bids, after any applicable protocol, marketplace or third-party fees, form the auction reserve. The auction reserve is progressively made available to *miners* again through the daily reward pool. In order to get EDRSM, miners must give attention and contribute a symbolic amount of GRAM; this process is referred to as attention tokenization.

III.1 Rewards for the miners

The EDRSM reward pool:

For a day d , the EDRSM reward pool $R(d)$ is filled with the daily releases $R_a(d)$ from the current auctions a and, if applicable, from the daily releases $R_{ii}(d)$ from the initial issuance ii :

$$R(d) = \sum_a R_a(d) + R_{ii}(d) \quad (1)$$

The allocation of reward per miner:

For a day d , the daily reward allocation $R_m(d)$ of a miner m in a population of n miners is given by:

$$R_m(d) = AW_m(d) \times R(d) \quad (2)$$

with:

- $AW_m(d) = \frac{Au_m(d)}{\sum_{k=1}^n Au_k(d)}$ the attention weight of a miner m among the overall attention

given to the protocol on a day d .

- $Au_m(d)$ the number of attention units (Au) attributed to miner m for the attention contributed to the Protocol during day d . Attention Units are currently measured off-chain through an engagement Mini App integrated in Telegram.

NB: The methods, signals and mechanisms used to measure eligible attention may evolve over time as the Protocol develops, including through the introduction of new engagement signals, verification mechanisms or on-chain measurements. Such evolution does not alter the role of Attention Units within the reward allocation mechanism. The Protocol is designed to measure attention, not a specific form of interaction.

In order to get this reward and finish the tokenization of their attention, the miner m must contribute a symbolic amount of GRAM which is capped: their effective reward is given by:

$$ER_m(d) = Cr_m(d) \times R_m(d) \quad (3)$$

with :

- $Cr_m(d) = \frac{C_m(d)}{C_{max}(d)}$ the contribution rate of the miner m for the day d
- $C_m(d) \in [C_{min}(d); C_{max}(d)]$ the symbolic contribution in GRAM of the miner m for the day d .

To preserve the core philosophy of the protocol, the miner cannot contribute more than a symbolic amount of GRAM called $C_{max}(d)$ (and corresponding to its full reward allocation) and the miner is free to contribute a smaller amount of GRAM to receive a proportionate amount of their reward allocation. In the interest of the community and the ecosystem, as well as to preserve its independence-from-wealth philosophy, $C_{max}(d)$ may vary over time depending on different variables, e.g the USDT/GRAM exchange rate.

III.2 Rewards for the auctioneers and interfaces

The redistribution of EDRSM collected by auctions:

Also, the total of EDRSM effectively distributed by the protocol is equal to:

$$ER(d) = \sum_m ER_m(d) \quad (4)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Leftrightarrow ER(d) &= \sum_m Cr_m(d) \times R_m(d) \\ \Leftrightarrow ER(d) &= \overline{Cr(d)} \times R(d) \\ \Leftrightarrow ER(d) &= \overline{Cr(d)} \times \left[\sum_a R_a(d) + R_{ii}(d) \right] \end{aligned}$$

i.e:

$$ER(d) = \sum_a ER_a(d) + ER_{ii}(d) \quad (5)$$

with $R_a(d)$ the daily release share of a the winner-bids A_a (in EDRSM) for an auction a starts on the day d_a and is equal to:

$R_a(d)$	if	(6)
$R_a(d) = RR_a(d) \times A_a$	$[RR_a(d) \times A_a] \leq \left[A_a - \sum_{t=d_a}^{d-1} ER_a(t) \right]$	
$R_a(d) = A_a - \sum_{t=d_a}^{d-1} ER_a(t)$	$[RR_a(d) \times A_a] > \left[A_a - \sum_{t=d_a}^{d-1} ER_a(t) \right]$	

with $RR_a(d)$ the release rate which is calculated as follows:

$RR_a(d)$	if
0.48%	$0 \leq \frac{\sum_{t=d_a}^{d-1} ER_a(t)}{A_a} < 48\%$
0.24%	$48\% \leq \frac{\sum_{t=d_a}^{d-1} ER_a(t)}{A_a} < 72\%$
0.16%	$72\% \leq \frac{\sum_{t=d_a}^{d-1} ER_a(t)}{A_a} < 88\%$
0.12%	$88\% \leq \frac{\sum_{t=d_a}^{d-1} ER_a(t)}{A_a} < 100\%$

(7)

In other terms, the auction amortizes its net EDRSM proceeds on a theoretical duration of 400 days when $\overline{Cr(d)} = 1$ (100 days for each release rate) and amortizes it on a longer duration when $\overline{Cr(d)} < 1$.

For an easier understanding, the term: $\frac{\sum_{t=d_a}^{d-1} ER_a(t)}{A_a}$ represents the share of effective rewards from auction a cumulatively distributed since the beginning of its amortization on the day d_a , in other words the cumulative effective release of rewards from auction a on the period $[d_a; (d - 1)]$

The purpose of the decreasing release rate is to balance immediate impact with long-term contribution to the ecosystem.

An auction initially releases a larger share of its EDRSM reserve, allowing significant auctions to have an immediate effect on mining rewards and on the allocation of symbolic contributions. As the reserve is progressively amortized, its release rate decreases, extending its economic impact over time.

This mechanism allows auctions of different sizes and frequencies to coexist within the same reward pool: smaller and recurring auctions continuously contribute to mining activity, while larger auctions can temporarily increase rewards without releasing their entire impact over a short period.

As only EDRSM effectively claimed by miners are deducted from auction reserves, lower mining activity mechanically slows their amortization. Unclaimed EDRSM therefore remain available for future distribution rather than being lost.

An auction therefore has two simultaneous effects: the EDRSM it attracts determines its share in the allocation of symbolic contributions, while its reserve becomes a future source of

mining rewards. Auction activity therefore does not only consume previously mined competitiveness: it redistributes it over time.

The allocation of GRAM reward for auctioneers and interfaces:

The total of symbolic contributions of the miners $C(d)$ in GRAM is given by:

$$C(d) = \sum_m C_m(d) \quad (8)$$

As every mining operation is done through a registered interface, we can also write:

$$C(d) = \sum_i \sum_{m_i} C_{i,m_i}(d) \quad (9)$$

with m_i the miners using the interface i .

It is split to reward both the auctioneers of the auction a (noted G_a) and the interfaces i (noted G_i) which make the protocol function:

$$C(d) = \sum_a G_a(d) + \sum_i G_i(d) \quad (10)$$

with:

- $\sum_a G_a(d) = Sh_A \times C(d)$ with: Sh_A the share of GRAM rewards allocated to the auctioneers
- $\sum_i G_i(d) = Sh_I \times C(d)$ with: Sh_I the share of GRAM rewards allocated to the interfaces

During the time of amortization, each auction a represents a share of the EDRSM pool through its daily release: $\frac{R_a(d)}{R(d)}$. This is used to calculate the reward of the auctioneer organizing the auction a :

$$G_a(d) = \frac{R_a(d)}{R(d)} \times C(d) \times Sh_A \quad (11)$$

For the interfaces, it is the share of $C(d)$ they succeeded to contribute during the mining:

$$G_i(d) = \sum_{m_i} C_{i,m_i}(d) \times Sh_I \quad (12)$$

III.3 Initial issuance

The Community allocation of EDRSM will be released daily for 4 consecutive eras of 400 consecutive days (total 1600 consecutive days), as of 10/09/2026. After each era, the daily

issuance decreases, following fundamental principles and best practices for early incentives and important public adoption.

The daily initial issuance is inspired by the halving principle but slightly adapted to a community-driven token with short period of issuance; it follows the formula:

$$R_{ii}(d) = RR_{ii}(d) \times Allocation_{Community} \quad (13)$$

with: the daily release rate during initial issuance

with:

- $RR_{ii}(d) = \frac{0,12\%}{1} = 0,12\% \quad \forall d \in [1; 400]$
- $RR_{ii}(d) = \frac{0,12\%}{2} = 0,06\% \quad \forall d \in [401; 800]$
- $RR_{ii}(d) = \frac{0,12\%}{3} = 0,04\% \quad \forall d \in [801; 1200]$
- $RR_{ii}(d) = \frac{0,12\%}{4} = 0,03\% \quad \forall d \in [1201; 1600]$

For simplicity, the daily issuance rates for the day d and the respective issuances of EDRSM are:

Days	Daily Initial Issuance rate	Daily Initial Issuance
1 → 400	0,12%	96 000 000
401 → 800	0,06%	48 000 000
801 → 1200	0,04%	32 000 000
1201 → 1600	0,03%	24 000 000

Unlike EDRSM held in auction reserves, which remain available for future distribution until effectively claimed by miners, the initial issuance follows a predefined release schedule.

EDRSM from the Community allocation that remains undistributed at the end of the initial issuance period will remain within the Community allocation. Its subsequent treatment may be determined at a later stage in accordance with the development of the Endorsium ecosystem and the interests of the community.

No specific subsequent distribution mechanism for such undistributed EDRSM is committed to by this Whitepaper.

III.4 Economic properties

The interaction between mining, auctions, auction reserves and symbolic contributions results in several economic properties.

Access independent from financial price

The EDRSM auction is independent from the financial value of the auctioned good or service. Winning depends exclusively on the relative competitiveness of participants within the Endorsium ecosystem. In other terms, EDRSM wealth represents competitiveness in the Endorsium ecosystem.

EDRSM wealth represents the cumulated direct and indirect impact of a holder on the Endorsium ecosystem. Access to goods and services can therefore be determined by accumulated contribution to the ecosystem rather than by financial wealth.¹

Redistribution of competitiveness

EDRSM effectively received by the Protocol from auctions form auction reserves that are progressively made available to miners again.

An auction therefore transfers competitiveness from existing holders back toward miners over time. EDRSM used to obtain access today consequently contributes to the creation of future access opportunities.

As auction reserves are depleted only when released EDRSM are effectively claimed, their lifetime also adjusts to mining activity. Lower claiming activity preserves reserves for future cycles, while higher claiming activity accelerates their redistribution.

Heterogeneous auction activity

Because auction reserves progressively contribute to a common daily reward pool, auctions do not need to have comparable sizes or frequencies.

Recurring auctions can continuously contribute to mining rewards, while exceptional auctions can temporarily increase the daily reward pool and continue contributing through their remaining reserves over time.

Different auctioneers can therefore coexist within the same mining economy without requiring separate reward systems.

Impact-based funding

Symbolic contributions generated through mining are redistributed according to distinct forms of contribution to the ecosystem:

- Auctioneers are rewarded according to the relative amount of EDRSM their auctions contribute to the protocol. EDRSM spent in auctions therefore acts not only as a bidding instrument, but also as a signal used to allocate GRAM contributions.
- Interfaces are rewarded for distributing access to mining and generating effective mining activity.

An entity may perform either or both functions. An auctioneer may also operate a mining interface, while an interface may participate without organizing auctions.

¹ **NB:** if a secondary market for EDRSM emerges, financial wealth may become an additional factor for the Endorsium competition, however in such a case it only means miners decided to sell parts of their competitiveness to others. So, by purchasing EDRSM on the secondary market, the competitor still brings indirect value to the ecosystem by bringing direct value to its miners – which we call “indirect impact”.

Adaptive equilibrium

The mining economy adjusts to both mining and auction activity. When mining activity increases faster than available rewards, individual EDRSM allocations decrease. Conversely, additional auction activity creates new reserves and progressively increases the amount of EDRSM available for mining.

The effective depletion of these reserves also depends on the proportion of allocations claimed by miners. The system therefore does not require a fixed relationship between the number of miners, the number of auctions or their respective sizes.

Circular function of EDRSM

EDRSM performs different functions throughout the same economic cycle.

- When mined, it represents individual competitiveness.
- When spent in auctions, it becomes a signal of attractiveness.
- Within auction reserves, it represents future mining capacity.
- Once released and claimed again, it returns to individual competitiveness.

EDRSM can therefore circulate between individual access, collective signaling and redistribution without requiring continuous token issuance.

Ecosystem scalability

The growth of the ecosystem reinforces the intrinsic utility of EDRSM through two complementary effects:

- If there are more auctions, holders have a wider range of opportunities to use their EDRSM, increasing the number of competing opportunities over which they may allocate them.
- If there are more miners, for a given daily reward pool, the average amount of EDRSM rewarded per miner decreases as rewards are distributed among a larger population.

This could be a problem if EDRSM were a payment token, as a growing ecosystem would make it increasingly difficult to accumulate the amount required to purchase a given good or service. However, under the auction-like principle, no predetermined amount of EDRSM is required to obtain an auctioned good or service. Competition remains relative and can therefore operate at any average level of EDRSM holdings.

Therefore, growth on both sides of the ecosystem consequently reinforces the intrinsic utility of EDRSM. This effect is independent from any secondary-market valuation of EDRSM.

This property allows the model to scale in both the number of miners and the number of auctions.

Ecosystem extensibility

Endorsium is designed as an extensible ecosystem. While this Whitepaper describes its initial economic primitives around attention, EDRSM and auctions, additional applications and digital primitives may be developed over time.

These may include, among others, TON-based digital collectibles, identity and reputation mechanisms, domain names and subdomains, access credentials, or other applications built by Endorsium or independent participants of the ecosystem.

Such developments are not required for the operation of the mechanisms described in this Whitepaper and should not be understood as commitments to deliver any particular future functionality.

IV. CONCLUSION

We proposed a protocol to tokenize attention and use it as an alternative means of access to goods and services.

Through the auction-like principle, attention is converted into EDRSM competitiveness, which can be used to compete independently from any predetermined financial price. EDRSM spent through auctions is progressively redistributed to miners, while the resulting symbolic contributions reward the actors generating and distributing activity within the ecosystem.

This circular mechanism allows mining participation and auction activity to scale without requiring a fixed amount of EDRSM to represent a given purchasing power.

Endorsium therefore provides a framework in which access can be determined by relative contribution to an ecosystem rather than by the ability to pay a predetermined price.